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Chapter 17

Protection against the Forced Return of War
Refugees
An Interdisciplinary Consensus on Humanitarian Non-Refoulement
Jennifer Moore
The close relationship between refugee law and international humanitarian
law (ihl) reflects their mutual affirmation of human dignity, whether in the
face of political repression or military violence. Refugee law protects individuals who flee in well-founded fear of persecution on ethnic, religious or sociopolitical grounds. It seeks to shelter displaced persons, especially those who
cross international boundaries, from serious human rights abuses and to provide for their basic needs. ihl, for its part, seeks to protect the hors de combat
(non-combatants) from the outrages of armed conflict. It applies specifically
in time of war to shield civilians, wounded combatants and prisoners from
military attack and inhuman treatment. Both refugee law and ihl are born of
exigent circumstances; both have a humanitarian character, in that they seek
to alleviate the suffering of war and persecution; both use the language of protection; and both aim higher than they reach. The two fields have much in
common, but their scholars and practitioners spend a fair amount of time
marking the legal, theoretical and operational boundaries that separate them.
The substantial common ground between refugee law and ihl expands when
we adapt a more dynamic definition of both legal fields. For refugee law this
involves a meaningful response to the plight of internally displaced persons
[idps], and the recognition that the protection of idps is intrinsically connected to the protection of cross-border refugees. For humanitarian law, this
dynamism entails addressing the responsibilities of signatories to the Geneva
Conventions1 to ensure respect for ihl in all times and all places, including in
countries of asylum far from the zone of conflict.
The 1951 Refugee Convention establishes the framework for international
refugee protection, under the leadership of the un High Commissioner for
Refugees [unhcr]. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the International
1 The ‘Geneva Conventions’ is a general reference to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
particularly Geneva Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (Fourth Geneva
Convention).
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Committee of the Red Cross [icrc] are the standard-bearers for international
humanitarian law. Yet, despite their distinct constitutional treaties and governing organizations, refugee law and ihl are frequently applied in the same contexts – in refugee camps and idp settlements,2 detention facilities and transit
centers, borderlands and more distant countries of asylum.3 Moreover, practitioners of refugee law and ihl are equally accustomed to confronting the wide
divide between the State’s legal obligation to ensure respect for human rights,
on the one hand, and state powerlessness or complicity in the face of the harsh
realities of war, persecution and displacement, on the other. Refugee law
aspires to durable status in countries of asylum for victims of persecution, but
not infrequently presides over the prolonged encampment of displaced persons in marginal circumstances. ihl demands respect for the norms of humanity, distinction, necessity and proportionality, but all too often bears witness to
war crimes and crimes against humanity in which non-combatants are brutalised. Given their common contexts, objectives, and challenges, the need for
common cause between the two fields is irrefutable.
Despite their sixty-plus years of shared history, unhcr and icrc lawyers
sometimes become preoccupied by the mandates of their institutions and distracted from the worsening plight of the war refugees whose needs their organizations were created to serve. A disciplined insistence upon clarity regarding
the proper application of refugee law and ihl may devolve into distracting
2 ‘IDP settlements’ is a reference to camps established for so-called internally displaced persons (idps). Essentially idps are forced migrants who have not crossed an international
boundary, but who otherwise have similar motivations and needs to those of refugees as
defined according to the Refugee Convention. While idps are not covered by the 1951 Refugee
Convention, they are the subject of another treaty, which entered into force in 2012. See 2009
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa, 22 October 2009 (entered into force 6 December 2012) (Kampala Convention)
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae572d82.html> accessed 1 March 2014; see generally W. Kidane, ‘Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: the Role of the New African
Union IDPs Convention’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt J Tran’l L 1. For a vision of refugee law encompassing protections for ‘internal refugees’, e.g. idps, as well as ‘cross-border refugees’, see
J. Moore, Humanitarian Law in Action within Africa (oup 2012) 159–166 and 171, n 40.
3 While ihl applies in situations of armed conflict, it may nonetheless have indirect application outside the zone of conflict itself. Since the 1980s the Art 1 responsibility of state parties
to the Fourth Geneva Convention to ‘ensure respect’ for the treaty has been utilized to
demand that states of would-be asylum not deport asylum seekers to countries in which
civilians are the victims of indiscriminate military attack (see J. Moore, ‘Simple Justice:
Humanitarian Law as a Defense Against Deportation’ (1991) 4 Harvard H Rts LJ 19; see also
D. Perluss and J.F. Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm’ (1985–
1986) 26 Virginia J Int’l L 551).

This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV

Protection against the Forced Return of War Refugees

413

struggles regarding whose lex is more specialis.4 In such situations war refugees
may find themselves caught in a terra nullius between the two legal domains,
enjoying the benefits of neither while they merit the protection of both. Where
two bodies of law offer specific norms relevant to situations characterised by
extreme violence, suffering and lawlessness, an exacting search for the lex specialis may frustrate as much as facilitate constructive action. To secure better
protections for war refugees, concurrent and complementary legal frameworks
are essential. Such emergent situations cry out for a ‘lex communis’ composed
of overarching principles, spanning both refugee law and ihl, to better protect
war refugees from further brutalization. In seeking such common principles,
we recognise and respect the differences in their precise application under
either regime, while trying to avoid getting bogged down in technicalities. In
such a spirit, this chapter is a call to collective action on the part of the refugee
advocacy and Red Cross movements. It is a challenge to all refugee and humanitarian lawyers that we seek common ground, acknowledging our shared
responsibility to make operational the fundamental legal protections for war
refugees, which are rooted in both fields.
The purpose of this chapter is not to survey the precise outer limits of refugee law and international humanitarian law, or to argue which normative system takes priority in specific situations. Rather, the analysis acknowledges the
bountiful shared terrain between refugee law and ihl, and seeks to build upon
this concurrent jurisdiction in creative and constructive terms. One concrete
expression of the fundamental synergy between refugee law and ihl is the
shared commitment to protecting individuals from forcible transfer to lifethreatening circumstances. This chapter focuses on the prohibition against the
forced return of individuals displaced by armed conflict, and explores the legal
heritage of this so-called ‘humanitarian form of non-refoulement’, rooted in the
fertile ground of refugee law, ihl, and related fields of international law and
practice.5 Humanitarian non-refoulement is a fruitful place to start in reclaiming the space of protection for war refugees.
The freedom from fear is integral to the theory and practice of refugee law
and ihl, and entails access to safety and decent living conditions without
4 The legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ holds that a more specific rule (i.e., a rule
governing a specific situation) should trump more general rules. This maxim is designed to
ensure that the most relevant and finely tuned principles are utilized to resolve specific
dilemmas that the law is called upon to address.
5 It should be noted at the outset that the conceptual framework underlying this chapter does
not insist upon a fine distinction between non-refoulement and so-called ‘temporary refuge’,
in contrast to other scholars who posit a clearer separation between the two concepts (see
J.F. Durieux, ‘Three Asylum Paradigms’ (2013) 20 Int’l J Minority and Group Rts 165).
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which both the notion of refuge and the principle of humanity have little meaning. Protection against forced return to the danger zone is a clear nexus between
the two fields. Humanitarian non-refoulement takes the mandatory protection
against forced return6 enjoyed by individuals who meet the well-founded fear
of persecution-based definition of the refugee, and extends it to individuals
who flee international or non-international armed conflicts. Humanitarian
non-refoulement recognises that the State prerogative to exclude individuals
seeking safe passage at and inside the border is trumped by the reality of war
atrocities just as it is overruled by the likelihood of persecution upon return.
The prohibition against deportation to indiscriminate military attacks, socalled ‘humanitarian non-refoulement’, resonates across various domains of
international law. In addition to its importance in the context of refugee law
and ihl, humanitarian non-refoulement has broader relevance to the promotion of international peace and security, implementation of the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P), and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals
(mdgs). While frequently misconceived in exclusive terms of military intervention to end systemic and egregious human rights abuses, R2P has a powerful humanitarian dimension that is realised through the provision of emergency
relief and safe harbor to individuals displaced by crimes against humanity. For
their part, the Millennium Development Goals obligate States, individually
and collectively, to address the root causes of armed conflict and repression
and to shelter those who flee such violence, no matter where those conflicts
exist. Both R2P and the mdgs will be furthered through the promotion of poverty alleviation and human development in regions of conflict, as well as the
provision of relief from deportation to war refugees who have sought refuge
outside the danger zone.
Through humanitarian non-refoulement, victims of war atrocities and persecution may become survivors of violence and agents of conflict resolution
and social development in their own right. In this sense, humanitarian nonrefoulement is an essential factor in the effective implementation of R2P and
the mdgs. It is also a reminder to the international community of the responsibilities of States located outside the zone of insecurity. For as long as States
outside the conflict zone remain stymied in their capacity or will to help end
armed conflict, widespread repression and endemic poverty in other countries, they have a responsibility to shelter and empower those war refugees
who have been able to flee violent circumstances, rather than re-victimizing
them through forced return.
6 See Art 33(1) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered
into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention).
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The principle of protection is multi-faceted and cannot be claimed as
the exclusive province of refugee law or the unique mandate of the law of
armed conflict. It encompasses refuge from persecution and war, shelter
from genocide, and progress toward socio-economic self-sufficiency.
Humanitarian non-refoulement creates the opportunity for refugee and
humanitarian law practitioners and scholars to embrace a broader conception of humanitarian protection, one which entails engagement in conflict
resolution and poverty alleviation as well as the provision of safe harbor,
life-saving shelter and sustenance. The three sections to follow explore
the roots and branches of humanitarian non-refoulement in refugee law
and international humanitarian law, the Responsibility to Protect, and the
Millennium Development Goals.
1

Non-Refoulement as a Convergence of Refugee Law and
Humanitarian Law

This section will start with humanitarian non-refoulement in its more traditional historical context. Non-refoulement springs from the common ground of
refugee law and international humanitarian law, whose bedrock is a venerable
humanitarian institution of sanctuary predating both the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the 19th century Red Cross movement. Various forms of refuge
and protection from persecution and violence were recognised during the
Greco-Roman and Early Christian periods,7 and similar doctrines were formalised in the pre-Islamic and Koranic traditions.8 Building upon this historical foundation, 20th century refugee law and the law of armed conflict give
us our modern definitions of the refugee and protection from unlawful
deportation.
1.1
Refugee Law
International law defines the refugee as a person with a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, according to the 1951 Refugee
7 See I. Bau, This Ground is Holy: Church Sanctuary and Central American Refugees (Paulist
Press 1985) 124–133, exploring various forms of temple and alter sanctuary in Ancient Greece,
Rome and the Early Christian Church.
8 See G.M. Arnaout, Asylum in the Arab-Islamic Tradition (unhcr 1987) 14–21, exploring the
pre-Islamic Arab tradition of ijara and the Koranic concept of amân, both linked to notions
of asylum from persecution or refuge for the wayfaring stranger.
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Convention.9 Despite its dedication to the ‘status of refugees’, the treaty does
not require sovereign States to grant durable asylum let alone citizenship to
refugees.10 Therefore the norm of non-refoulement – the mandatory protection
against forcible return to likely persecution – remains the heart of refugee law,
perhaps the most important norm that this body of law has to offer.11 The refugee is not assured long-term status, but she must enjoy protection from involuntary return to the dangerous situation in which her life or freedom would be
at risk.12 The centrality of non-return to the very concept of refugee protection
cannot be denied, and is evidenced in numerous pronouncements by the
9

10
11

12

Refugee Convention, Art 1(A)(2) defines a refugee as someone with a ‘well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion’.
Refugee Convention Art 34.
The non-discretionary character of non-refoulement derives from the language of Art 33
of the Refugee Convention: ‘[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (Art 33(1)). The state is only permitted to return a
refugee who constitutes a security risk or ‘a danger to the community’ (Art 33(2)). For all
refugees who do not threaten the community they seek to enter, the state is prohibited
from expelling or returning them to the danger zone. The non-discretionary nature of
non-refoulement is in contrast to the discretionary nature of asylum. While states may
grant durable status to refugees, they are not obligated to do so – as per Art 34: ‘The
Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees’.
The question of whether non-refoulement has attained the status of a jus cogens, or
peremptory, norm is somewhat controversial, in light of Art 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention. The author takes the position that non-refoulement is a fundamental entitlement of all refugees who do not threaten the national community in which they seek
refuge. See Moore (n 2) 155–157; also J. Moore, ‘Restoring the Humanitarian Character of
U.S. Refugee Law: Lessons from the International Community’ (1997) 15 Berk J Intl L 51,
53–58. Other legal scholars argue explicitly for the jus cogens status of the norm. See
generally J. Allain, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement’ (2001) 13 IJRL 533;
A. Farmer, ‘Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten
Refugee Protection’ (2008) 23 Georgetown Imm LJ 1.
Durieux (n 5) 167 has a distinct assessment, arguing that ‘the Convention’s focus is on
admission as a positive duty’ because ‘the principle of non-refoulement is not the foundation of the [Refugee] Convention, but its cornerstone’. While the focus of this chapter is
on non-refoulement for war refugees, it is vital to recognize that all refugees need and
deserve more than minimal relief from forced return to war atrocities and persecution.
Refugee protection is multi-dimensional. Fully realized, it entails admission and full
membership in a national community.

This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV

Protection against the Forced Return of War Refugees

417

Executive Committee of unhcr emphasizing ‘the fundamental importance of
the principle of non-refoulement’.13
Our question is whether international refugee law extends the protection of
non-refoulement to other fearful individuals who do not meet the 1951 Refugee
Convention definition of a ‘refugee’. Certainly the Convention itself does not
explicitly refer to ‘war refugees’. Nevertheless, the regional treaty dedicated to
the protection of refugees on the African continent has expanded the refugee
definition to encompass individuals displaced by armed conflict,14 and
includes such war refugees within the purview of its norm of non-refoulement.15
Moreover, on various occasions since 1959, the un General Assembly has mandated the un High Commissioner for Refugees to provide material assistance
and legal protection for individuals in ‘refugee-like’ situations, including those
displaced by both international and non-international armed conflicts.16
Thus, while treaty-based international refugee law remains focused on
persecution-fleeing refugees, in certain regions of the world, and in the practice of international organizations, refugees from war are also deemed worthy
of special legal protection. Because even the Refugee Convention does not
ensure the right to durable asylum, the strongest entitlement to legal protection for war refugees, as for refugees who fear persecution, is the guarantee of
non-refoulement. The claim that war refugees are entitled to freedom from
forced return, despite their omission in explicit terms from the provisions of
the Refugee Convention, is in accord with the inclusive spirit of its framers
when the treaty was opened for signature in 1951:
13

14

15

16

See Moore, ‘Restoring the Humanitarian Character’ (n 11) 56 and n 32, citing twenty-four
separate Conclusions of the unhcr Executive Committee over a fifteen-year period
reminding states of their solemn responsibility to respect the norm of non-refoulement.
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September
1969, 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974) (African Refugee Convention) Art I(2)
(‘the term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to…events seriously disturbing public order…is compelled to leave…’) It can easily be argued that an armed conflict is an event ‘seriously disturbing public order’, as in the chapter by Wood in this
volume.
African Refugee Convention Art II(3): ‘(n)o person shall be subjected by a Member State
to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion…where his life, physical
integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Art I(1) and (2)…’.
unga Resolution 1388 (XIV) 20 November 1959; unga Resolution 1673 (XVI) 18 December
1961; unga Resolution 3454 (XXX) 9 December 1975. The 1959 and 1961 resolutions charged
unhcr with providing material assistance to those in ‘refugee-like situations’ who did
not meet the Refugee Convention definition. The 1975 resolution went the further step of
authorizing unhcr to extend the legal mantle of protection to such individuals.
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THE CONFERENCE,
Expresses the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
will have value as an example exceeding its contractual scope and that all
nations will be guided by it in granting so far as possible to persons in
their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the terms of
the Convention, the treatment for which it provides.17
As international refugee law expands its zone of protection to encompass the
plight of war refugees, international humanitarian law steps in to help define
those survivors of war who are in need of protection from forced return. Like
refugee law, the jus in bello is fundamentally concerned with the dignity and
humane treatment of individuals who are vulnerable to the abusive exercise of
power. Humanitarian non-refoulement thus becomes another means by which
ihl may shield non-combatants from the brutality of armed conflict.
1.2
Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law, the jus in bello, governs the conduct of armed
conflict, and protects persons hors de combat, including wounded soldiers and
sailors, prisoners of war and civilians. Just as 20th century refugee law had its
precursors in the ancient traditions of sanctuary from persecution, 20th century humanitarian law built upon principles of humanity in war dating from
the time of Grotius.18 The modern rules of ihl, known as ‘the law of Geneva’,
are codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional
Protocols of 1977.19 While there is no explicit reference to non-refoulement of
17

18
19

Refugee Convention, Annex I, Excerpt from the Final Act of the United Nations
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 189 UNTS
137 (Refugee Convention Annex I).
Moore (n 2) 45–46 and n 9.
Alongside the Fourth Geneva Convention (n 1) see: Geneva Convention (No. I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded an Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention (No. II)
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950);
Geneva Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August
1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (Protocol
I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609
(entered into force 7 December 1978) (Protocol II).
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war refugees in the Geneva Conventions, the prohibition against the forced
return of individuals displaced by both international and non-international
armed conflicts can be derived from certain treaty provisions, and more importantly from the customary principles of international humanitarian law, which
underlie the treaties themselves.20
Starting with the Fourth Geneva Convention, which concerns the protection of civilians in wartime, Article 147 of that treaty defines ‘unlawful deportation or transfer’ of a ‘protected person’ as a ‘grave breach’ of the Convention.21
The reference to ‘unlawful deportation’ may be a thin reed on which to hang
the norm of humanitarian non-refoulement, however. First of all, the Fourth
Geneva Convention, like its three sister treaties, applies mainly to international armed conflict, whereas humanitarian non-refoulement protects individuals displaced by all sorts of armed conflict, including internal or ‘civil’
wars. Second, ‘protected persons’ are defined in Article 4 of the treaty to comprise individuals ‘in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power’
rather than individuals seeking refuge in a country outside the zone of conflict.22 Nevertheless, the Article 147 reference to unlawful deportation must be
read in the spirit of the Convention as a whole. In this regard, the opening
provisions of all four Geneva Conventions set the tone for an expansive interpretation of signatory obligations, and one that would prohibit both direct and
indirect violations of the treaty by a State party.
In particular, Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, common to all four
Geneva Conventions, provides that the ‘High Contracting Parties undertake to
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’.23
The Article 1 obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect for’ the Fourth Geneva
Convention encompasses two sets of duties. First, a party to the Fourth Geneva
Convention must ‘respect’ the treaty by honoring its provisions and refraining
from any direct violations. Second, that party must ‘ensure respect for’ the
treaty by positively influencing conduct by other actors in accord with its provisions. Thus, under its primary duties a State cannot commit atrocities against
civilians, and under its secondary duties the State cannot take actions that
facilitate or tolerate the commission of atrocities by other actors. 24 The forced
20
21
22
23
24

See generally Moore (n 3) 11–46.
Geneva Convention No. IV Art 147. See the chapter by Cantor in this volume for
commentary.
Ibid, Art 4.
Ibid, Art 1.
In fact, the ‘ensure respect’ language of the Art 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention could
also imply an affirmative duty on the part of State signatories to stop wartime atrocities by
other actors. Thus a lesser duty to refrain from actions that would facilitate future war
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return of civilians, by a signatory, to a war in which civilians are the intentional
or indiscriminate targets of military attack, would facilitate the commission of
future atrocities. Thus humanitarian non-refoulement, which protects civilians
from forced return to a situation of widespread war crimes, is required by the
spirit of Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, an argument further developed by Ruvi Ziegler in his chapter on Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions.25
While the signatory State’s obligation to ‘ensure respect’ for the Geneva
Conventions is an important basis for limiting its prerogative to deport individuals from its territory, Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions does not operate
in a normative vacuum. Rather, the customary principles that gave rise to the
law of Geneva are an equally vital source from which to derive and define the
norm of humanitarian non-refoulement. In his influential study of customary
international humanitarian law, Jean Pictet identified several tiers of principles underlying the Geneva Conventions, which ‘are rooted in the custom of
peoples, from which none may depart’.26 As he explained, many of these principles ‘existed, potentially, before the conclusion of the agreement, as an
expression of international custom. The principles can therefore be said to
have come before the law, and to govern it after codification’.27
Pictet’s distillation of the age-old norms of customary humanitarian law is
painstaking and precise. First he identifies ‘fundamental principles’, which
include the basic ‘principle of the law of Geneva: persons placed hors de combat and those not directly participating in hostilities shall be respected, protected and treated humanely’.28 From there he proceeds to ‘common principles’,
which encompass the ‘principle of security, in accordance with which every
individual has a right to personal safety’.29 This principle comprises the prohibition against deportations, specifically when undertaken as a means of reprisal.30 Finally, Pictet identifies ‘principles specifically applicable to war victims’,
and among these he concludes with the ‘principle…of protection: the State

25

26
27
28
29
30

crimes by third parties is a relatively conservative interpretation of the ‘ensure respect’
obligation.
In his contribution to this volume, Ziegler explores the ‘ensure respect’ language of Art 1
as a basis for claiming a duty on the part of non-belligerent states to refrain for returning
refugees to the risks associated with armed conflict.
J.S. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (Henry Dunant Institute
1975) 28.
Ibid, 27.
Ibid, 28, 33.
Ibid, 34, 42.
Ibid, 42.
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must ensure the national and international protection of persons who have
fallen into its power’.31
Collectively, Pictet’s principles of humanity, safety and state protection
establish a broad and deep foundation for the customary norm of humanitarian non-refoulement. Protection from forced return helps prevent future violations of the jus in bello, guarding against the inhumane treatment of civilians.
It likewise creates some measure of security and safety not available in the
zone of conflict. But most importantly, humanitarian non-refoulement is an
expression of the State’s obligation to protect individuals within its power from
prospective violations of humanitarian law. Even if Pictet was envisioning
state protection primarily in terms of those states party to the conflict, there is
nothing in his conception that limits the customary ihl principle of protection to States engaged in armed conflict, or occupying foreign territory.
A broader understanding of protection would extend to all States that exercise
jurisdiction over war-affected individuals.
Humanitarian non-refoulement is also demonstrated in state practice,
including the immigration policy of the United States. In 1990, the us
Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to give the Attorney General
(now the Secretary of Homeland Security) the discretion to accord members
of certain national groups ‘temporary protected status’ (tps) and relief from
deportation based on conditions of unrest in the country of origin.32 One basis
for the extension of tps is the finding that ‘there is an ongoing armed conflict
within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return of aliens who
are nationals of that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose
a serious threat to their personal safety’.33 In 2013, nationals of eight different
countries enjoy tps in the United States, namely El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Syria.34 The us provision of temporary protected status and relief from deportation to individuals who have
fled to its shores to escape war-related violence and danger illustrates the norm
of humanitarian non-refoulement at work.
International refugee law and ihl dovetail in the norm of protecting war
refugees from forced return to armed conflicts characterised by indiscriminate
31
32
33
34

Ibid, 44, 47.
8 USC 1254a.
8 USC 1254a(b)(1)(A).
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ‘Temporary Protected Status’ fact sheet <www
.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-departure/
temporary-protected-status> accessed 1 March 2014. In addition to armed conflict, tps
can be extended on the basis of natural disaster, health epidemic, or other extraordinary
and temporary circumstances (see 8 USC 1254a(b)(1)(B)).
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attacks on the civilian population.35 At the same time, the concept of humanitarian non-refoulement is grounded in two additional and very important foundational principles of the un Charter itself: the prevention of genocide and the
elimination of crushing global poverty. Today, these two principles are
addressed in two interrelated global campaigns: the Responsibility to Protect
and the Millennium Development Goals, which are the subjects, respectively,
of the two remaining sections of this chapter.
2

Humanitarian Non-Refoulement as a Component of the
Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a call to state action to defend human
dignity in the face of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In
one sense, R2P is a modern iteration of the older norm of humanitarian intervention,36 but one which emphasises prevention and non-militarised
35

36

This chapter does not focus on the precise definitions of international and noninternational armed conflict, or even the difficulties in identifying and distinguishing
between the various forms of armed conflict. Nevertheless, as food for thought and further scholarly exploration, it is important to suggest the potential applications of humanitarian non-refoulement to situations of widespread violence, insecurity and displacement
that not all observers would identify as ‘armed conflict’. Examples might be the forced
relocation of populations by security forces (to facilitate mineral extraction by private
firms, for example) or the terror and displacement provoked by a militarized response to
the narcotics trade (such as the ‘narco wars’ in Mexico). Interestingly, while humanitarian
non-refoulement classically applies in civil war situations, it need not be so limited.
In fact, the oau Refugee Convention, the one refugee treaty that explicitly extends the
protection of non-refoulement to non-1951 Convention refugees, recognizes that refugees
also include those displaced by ‘events seriously disturbing public order’. For a fuller discussion of the nature of armed conflict, and the outer reaches of the typology of armed
conflict, see generally Moore (n 2).
While disputed by strict constructionists of the un Charter’s general prohibition against
the use of force, a purported customary norm of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has been
cited from time to time, particularly to justify a State’s armed intervention in a neighboring country on the basis of a claimed intention to stop crimes against humanity. The
historical record reveals two cases of alleged humanitarian intervention in 1978:
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia to stop Khmer Rouge atrocities against civilians; and
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda to stop the brutal policies of Idi Amin. See Moore (n 2) 50;
compare Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS xvi (entered into force 24
October 1945) (un Charter) Art 2(4): ‘All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
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responses to widespread attacks on communities. It flows from the un
Charter’s pledge ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person…’37 The contemporary usage of the term ‘Responsibility to Protect’
emerged from a publication by that name presented by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose authors called for
standards to govern ‘intervention on human protection grounds’.38 Former un
Secretary General Kofi Annan promoted the concept of R2P to the General
Assembly in his 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom’, and 150 members of the unga
endorsed it that same year.39 R2P has not yet been enshrined in a un Security
Council resolution nor has it been codified by regional or international treaty.
Whether R2P attains the status of customary law will depend on the extent to
which States act in accordance with it, out of a sense of legal obligation.
R2P is a controversial idea, in part because it is sometimes misperceived as
a state prerogative or obligation to use force to stop massive human rights violations. Focusing exclusively on military intervention, however, is an impoverishment of the vision of R2P. As articulated by Edward Luck, un Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon’s special advisor on R2P, the concept starts by affirming
the State’s responsibility to protect the human dignity of people on its territory; secondly, it encourages the State to seek help from other countries in
meeting its human rights obligations; from there, R2P requires other nations to
step in to provide life-saving assistance when the State cannot do so on its own;
and only as a last resort does R2P contemplate military action.40
The Responsibility to Protect entails both preventive as well as reactive
measures, and contemplates state interventions that are socio-economic as
much as military in nature. In fact, the most ambitious aspect of R2P may be its
socio-economic imperative: countries outside the zone of conflict are called
upon to feed, shelter and provide medical care to victims of crimes against

37
38

39

40

independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations’.
un Charter, Preamble.
See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (iciss) The
Responsibility to Protect (December 2001) http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index
.php/about-rtop/core-rtop-documents accessed 29 April 2014.
K. Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005)
para 125 http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/inlargerfreedom.shtml accessed 29 April
2014; see also unga Resolution 60/1 (24 October 2005) A/RES/60/1; Moore (n 2) 51–52.
See ‘An idea whose time has come – and gone?’ (23 July 2009) The Economist <http://
www.economist.com/node/14087788> accessed 1 March 2014.
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humanity. In the end, the greater challenge in implementing R2P is the economic burden it asks industrialised states to assume, rather than the military
liberties it allows them to take.
Certainly R2P conjures the notion of state intervention in another country,
with or without its invitation. But less appreciated is the obligation of the ‘protecting State’ to respond to the needs of displaced people within that State’s
own borders. The Responsibility to Protect is not inherently a challenge to the
territorial sovereignty of the State embroiled in conflict: its focus is on the individuals in need of protection and not the geographical locus of protection. In
this sense the obligation to provide life-saving assistance covers victims of
widespread violence who have fled the zone of conflict just as it concerns
those still caught in the danger zone. In fact, R2P’s preference for non-invasive
action is demonstrated in its spectrum of protective alternatives, which begins
with state self-help and state-invited outside assistance and only exceptionally
proceeds to uninvited or imposed actions. Given this continuum, the provision
of life-saving shelter and relief from deportation in a country of potential asylum should precede the contemplation of military and other forms of direct
intervention on the territory of the conflicted State itself.41
Humanitarian non-refoulement, or relief from deportation to indiscriminate
military violence, is a modest way for States outside the immediate region of
conflict to begin implementing their ‘responsibility to protect’. The State provides protection, within its own domestic legal system, to those individuals
who have made it to its shores, alongside any resources it expends to transport
tents and foodstuffs, medicine and other material assistance to larger numbers
of war-affected people still on the ground in the conflicted region. The sheltering State joins forces with those who have by their own agency left the conflict
zone, helping them by the simple virtue of not expulsing or forcing them to
return to the very danger they fled.
41

Barbour and Gorlick, in their 2008 article on the challenge of implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, confront the ‘mischaracterization of R2P as nothing more than
military intervention’. They argue that ‘the grant of asylum and other protection measures
are a good starting point to enacting R2P as they are devoid of the controversy surrounding military intervention’ (B. Barbour and B. Gorlick, ‘Embracing the “Responsibility to
Protect”: A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims’ (2008) 20 IJRL
533, 536). Barbour and Gorlick cite P. Bertrand, former Director of the unhcr New York
Office, who queried in 2007, ‘Would it not be logical to propose that, at a very minimum,
the R2P agenda be construed as encompassing states responsibility to provide asylum to
victims and/or potential victims of genocide and mass atrocities?’ (ibid, 564 and n 143).
Humanitarian non-refoulement, like asylum, falls within a class of victim-centered, preventive approaches to implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
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Relief from removal or deportation is often conceived as an act of grace or
discretion by a State, when in fact it is a matter of state obligation in multiple
situations. Non-refoulement is imperative when the individual has a wellfounded fear of persecution, under international refugee law; and when the
individual flees widespread violations of the laws of war, under international
humanitarian law. Arguably, under the mandate of R2P, non-refoulement is also
imperative when individuals flee crimes against humanity and massive human
rights abuses. In addition to these three contexts, humanitarian non-refoulement
has yet another protective dimension, which springs from state responsibility
to address the root causes of armed conflict throughout the world, including
entrenched poverty, socio-economic inequality and underdevelopment.
3

Humanitarian Non-Refoulement and the Millennium Development
Goals

Humanitarian non-refoulement is not customarily discussed in the context of
the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs). Non-refoulement is an emergency
measure, undertaken in the face of violence and repression, whereas the mdgs
are protracted responses to global socio-economic problems long in the making and longer in their resolution. Nevertheless, humanitarian non-refoulement
is precisely the kind of pragmatic response to human suffering that the mdgs
will require for their successful implementation. The roots of war, oppression
and poverty are deeply entwined, and protecting and assisting victims of war
is an essential pathway towards enhanced social wellbeing and meaningful
conflict prevention around the globe. Before evaluating humanitarian nonrefoulement as a component of the mdgs, however, it is important to address
the reality of socio-economic misery throughout the world, and to explore the
linkages between underdevelopment and war. This discussion starts with an
exploration of the term ‘development’ itself.
3.1
The Human Development Gap and Armed Conflict
The United Nations has attempted to quantify the concept of development
through various specific indices of human security. As of 2010, the un
Development Programme (undp) designated 86 of the 194 members of the
United Nations as ‘developing countries’ and, within that subset, identified 49
as the ‘least developed countries’ (ldcs).42 In the ldcs over 50% of the
42

un Development Programme, undp Human Development Report for 2010 (2010) 227
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2010 accessed 29 April 2014.
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population lives in extreme poverty, meaning they subsist on $1.25 per day or
less.43 Generally, ldcs are characterised by a very modest per capita share of
national income, a low level of adult literacy, and a high level of hunger and
food insecurity.44 They are also notable for high levels of military violence.45
In addressing socio-economic conditions around the world, undp seeks to
rank particular nations in terms of their overall levels of ‘human development’.
Human development is defined in terms of several factors, the most significant
being life expectancy, years of schooling and gross national income (gni) per
capita. Worldwide, the mean life expectancy is 69.3 years, average years in
school are 7.4 and gni per capita is $10,631.46 The corresponding figures for the
least developed countries are 57.7 years life expectancy, 3.7 years in school, and
$1393 gni per capita.47 The gap in human security between the Global South
and the world as a whole is stark from this statistical perspective: over 10 years
less in life expectancy, half the years of primary education, and only 15% of the
gross national income per capita.
Socio-economic inequality is even greater if we compare human security
indicators in the Global South to those prevailing among the world’s richest
countries. In the industrialised North, life expectancy is 80 years, years of education average at 11 years, and the mean gni per capita is nearly $40,000.48
Considering these statistics, the human security divide is breathtaking: on
average people in the least developed countries live 20 years less, they stay in
school for one third of the time, and their gni per capita is 97% lower than
their counterparts in the Global North.
In addition to their daunting prospects in terms of life expectancy, access to
education and share of national income, people living in the least developing
countries are much more likely to experience the violence of war than their
peers in the Global North. un statistics graphically demonstrate the correlation between war and poverty: the likelihood of armed conflict in industrialised countries for the period between 1997 and 2006 was 1.6 percent, whereas
43

44
45
46
47
48

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Poverty Reduction and Progress
Towards MDGs in the LDCs: Encouraging Signs But Much Remains to Be Done’, Least
Developed Country Series, No. 20/E, May 2011 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/presspb20118
_en.pdf> accessed 1 March 2014. In 2007, 52.8% of the population of the world’s least
developed countries was living at or below the $1.25 extreme poverty line.
Moore (n 2) 78.
See footnote 47 below and related text.
undp Development Report (2010) 146.
Ibid.
Ibid, 227.
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it was 38.7 percent among the least developed countries.49 These numbers suggest that narrowing the development gap will promote conflict resolution, just
as assisting victims of war will enhance socio-economic development.
Combating Global Poverty, Hunger and War through Global
Partnership
A call for action to address the gaping wealth divide between the industrialised world and the Global South is rooted in the un Charter itself, whose
Preamble calls on member States ‘to employ international machinery for the
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples’. In 2000,
fifty-five years after the entry into force of the un Charter, the un General
Assembly promulgated the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs), which
established benchmarks and timelines for achieving eight specific objectives
of the United Nations in the area of socio-economic justice.50 Alongside (1)
poverty and hunger alleviation, (2) public education promotion, reductions
in (3) infant mortality and (4) maternal mortality, (5) increased gender equity,
(6) lessening of aids infection rates, and (7) progress towards environmental
sustainability, the Millennium Development Declaration called upon the
member States of the United Nations to establish (8) ‘a global partnership for
development’.51
As set by the Millennium Declaration, the first Millennium Development
Goal is a pledge to reduce the global rates of extreme poverty and food insecurity to half of their 1990 levels by 2015.52 People living in extreme poverty are
defined by the Millennium Declaration as those who strive to meet their basic
needs with $1 per day or less (the extreme poverty line has since been set at
$1.25 per day). The global poverty rate has been cut substantially, from 47% in
1990, to 24% in 2008, and, if current trends continue, will be at just below 16%
3.2

49

50

51

52

J. Siebert, ‘Addressing Armed Violence in Development Programming’, (2008) 29
Ploughshares Monitor 1 <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monm08e.pdf>
accessed 1 March 2014.
See United Nations Millennium Declaration, unga Resolution 55/2 (A/55/L.2) September 8,
2000, para 19 <www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf> accessed 29 April
2014.
In more specific terms, the Millennium Declaration sets eight specific benchmarks to
reach by 2015: (1) a one-half reduction in extreme poverty and hunger: (2) universal primary education; (3) the promotion of gender equity; (4) a two-thirds reduction in infant
mortality; (5) a three-quarter reduction in maternal mortality; (6) progress in combating
hiv/aids; (7) greater environmental sustainability; and (8) the establishment of a global
partnership for development (ibid).
Ibid, para 19.
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by 2015.53 Based on these statistics, the goal of slashing extreme poverty by
50% will soon be met. Nevertheless, progress in poverty alleviation has been
uneven across the various regions of the world, and poverty rates in the Global
South have not fallen as fast as global rates. In Africa, for example, where the
regional poverty rate was 25% higher than the global rate in 1990, the regional
rate is projected to be twice the global rate by 2015.54
Food insecurity is defined in terms of the percentage of people who are
‘undernourished’, or who have difficulty meeting their nutritional needs on a
daily basis. While food security has improved since 1990, the data reveal that
there has been significantly faster progress in the war on poverty than in the
war on hunger. For example, while extreme global poverty was 47% in 1990 and
is headed for 15% in 2015, parallel progress has not been achieved in the area of
hunger alleviation. Food insecurity, at 20% in 1990, hovered at 16% from 2000
to 2007, was still as high as 15.5% in 2011, and is not predicted to hit its mdg
target of 10% by 2015. The lack of corresponding improvements in the global
poverty and hunger rates signifies that rising income rates simply do not guarantee improved access to food.55
The ‘disconnect’ between rising incomes and commensurate improvements
in nutrition is of particular concern in times of global financial instability characterised by extreme volatility in the price of staple grains. In parts of the developing world, the average family spends 40% or more of its daily household
income on food.56 In the current global financial climate, it is not unusual for
53

54

55

56

See Millennium Development Goals Report 2012 (United Nations, New York, 2012)
(2012 MDG Report) 4, 7 <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/mdg
-report-2012.html> accessed 1 March 2014. Each yearly mdg Report includes c omplete
analysis of progress to date on each of the eight mdgs.
See Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 (United Nations, New York, 2011)
(2011 MDG Report) 6, 7 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/reports.shtml accessed 29
April 2014. The 2011 mdg Goals Report includes a particular focus on regional disparities
in progress towards poverty alleviation.
See 2011 MDG Report (n 54) 11. The 2011 Report discusses the slower progress in hunger
alleviation as compared to poverty alleviation in the period from 1990 to 2010. See also
2012 MDG Report (n 53) 11, 12: ‘The disparity between falling poverty rates and steady
levels of undernourishment calls for improved understanding of the dimensions and
causes of hunger and the implementation of appropriate policies and measures’.
In the United States, 7% of the average household income went to food in 2011. In contrast, the average Indonesian spent 43% of her income on food in 2011 (N. Jones, ‘Mapping
Global Food Spending’ (2011) Civil Eats (a daily news source on topics relating to sustainable agriculture) <http://civileats.com/2011/03/29/mapping-global-food-spending-info
graphic/> accessed 1 March 2014).
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the price of rice or other staple foodstuff to increase by 50% to 100% in the space
of several months.57 When grain prices fluctuate this radically, people living in
extreme poverty (those subsisting on $1.25 or less per day) who are already
spending nearly half their modest income on food may not be able to absorb the
higher price of food staples and still meet other essential needs for shelter, transportation and medicine. Instead, poor families may reduce their caloric intake
substantially, or be forced to skip meals or eat only once in a two-day period.
The challenge of promoting food security and implementing the other
Millennium Development Goals is particularly daunting in countries embroiled
in or emerging from armed conflicts, but all the more vital. In addition to the
connection between underdevelopment and armed conflict, research on the
relationship between hunger and war also reveals a strong correlation between
unrest and food insecurity. 58 Evidence that armed conflict is rooted in inequitable socio-economic conditions of life suggests that efforts to fight poverty
and alleviate hunger are powerful tools of conflict resolution. Thus the mdgs
have heightened relevance in countries embroiled in armed conflict, where
confronting the interconnected web of poverty and violence is an essential
pathway to durable peace.
Humanitarian Non-Refoulement and the Millennium Development
Goals in the Context of Civil Strife
The Millennium Development Goals have important applications in war situations, as illustrated by specific provisions addressing the security needs of war
refugees. In addition to demanding measurable improvements in the indices
of poverty and social misery throughout the world, the Millennium Declaration
shines its light on catastrophic humanitarian emergencies, and calls on States
to provide short-term and life-saving assistance to the victims and survivors of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a section devoted to ‘Protecting
the vulnerable’, the Declaration specifically addresses the reality of genocide
and armed conflict. Paragraph 26 of the Declaration encompasses the situation of refugees and displaced persons in countries outside the zone of violence, as well as those still living within it:
3.3

57

58

Between June 2010 and January 2011, the global price of wheat more than doubled (The
World Bank, ‘Food Price Watch’ (2011) <http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/food_price
_watch_report_feb2011.html> accessed 1 March 2014).
See generally, P. Pinstrup-Andersen and S. Shimokawa, ‘Do Poverty and Poor Health and
Nutrition Increase the Risk of Armed Conflict Onset?’ (2008) 33 Food Policy 513. The
authors conclude that government policies that improve access to food and health care
enhance stability.
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We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations
that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters,
genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given
every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as
soon as possible.
We resolve therefore:
• To expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, in conformity with international humanitarian law.
• To strengthen international cooperation, including burden sharing in,
and the coordination of humanitarian assistance to, countries hosting
refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reintegrated into their societies.59
Thus the Millennium Declaration, like the principle of R2P, commits States
outside the zone of conflict, and requires the protection of war refugees and
victims of crimes against humanity who have sought asylum in other countries. Humanitarian non-refoulement is one way that un member States can
contribute toward the Millennium Development Goals within their own borders, by providing temporary protection and basic material assistance to war
refugees until such time that they may freely choose to return to their homes
in ‘safety and dignity’.
The principle of non-refoulement for war refugees also helps ensure that the
burden of assisting individuals displaced by humanitarian emergencies is not
borne exclusively by developing States in the region of conflict, but also by
industrialised States in the Global North, in the spirit of the mdgs and the
global partnership for development.
4

Conclusion

This chapter has argued for a scholarly and practitioner consensus in support
of the norm of protection against forced return for war refugees. Humanitarian
non-refoulement extends to all individuals displaced by armed conflict characterised by widespread attacks on the civilian population, regardless of whether
they meet the persecution-based definition of a refugee set forth in the 1951
Refugee Convention. Both refugee law and international humanitarian law
are essential in defining the scope and application of the norm. Refugee law
59

Millennium Declaration para 26, emphasis added.
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clarifies the principle that while States have the right to grant durable asylum
on a discretionary basis, they are absolutely prohibited from returning individuals to situations in which their basic human rights are at risk. ihl helps us
identify those situations in which the occurrence of war atrocities requires the
provision of humanitarian non-refoulement, especially when attempts to stop
those atrocities have proven ineffective.
When the principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality and necessity
are violated, practitioners of ihl and refugee law focus much of their considerable operational skills on meeting the basic survival needs of individuals
displaced by wartime atrocities. Protection from forced return to the zone
of conflict is an important mechanism to ensure the safety and well-being of
war survivors. Humanitarian non-refoulement is also an expression of the
Responsibility to Protect. It is a powerful and non-violent measure to prevent
war refugees from falling victim to further war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Ensuring safe passage and shelter for war refugees shields them from
violence without resort to violence. Finally, humanitarian non-refoulement is
a facet of the global partnership for development contemplated by the
Millennium Development Goals. By virtue of humanitarian non-refoulement,
countries of asylum may contribute to improvements in human security at
home as well as abroad, by ensuring the welfare of those individuals who have
escaped from armed conflict and sought refuge within their borders.
The three conceptions of humanitarian non-refoulement explored in this
chapter are simultaneously three manifestations of a vibrant understanding of
humanitarian protection, all joining to forbid the forced return of war refugees. First, from the twin wellsprings of refugee law and international humanitarian law, we derive an integrated conception of protection in terms of
sheltering individuals from gross violations of human rights abuses and the
brutalities of armed conflict. Humanitarian non-refoulement requires that we
shelter victims of war as well as victims of persecution. Second, from the 21st
century articulation of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ we derive a protective
response to massive atrocities threatening entire societies and regions.
Humanitarian non-refoulement is a concrete means of implementing R2P, and
a non-military and preventive interpretation of ‘humanitarian intervention’
in the face of genocide and crimes against humanity. And, finally, the
Millennium Development Goals confront the reality of extreme poverty as a
way of life for billions of human beings throughout the world, and envision
protection in terms of human security and socio-economic wellbeing.
Humanitarian non-refoulement is an important domestic mechanism by which
States may contribute to international burden-sharing within the mdg framework. A melding together of non-refoulement and socio-economic security
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demands that we define humanitarianism in structural and transformative
terms, while inviting us to implement human development policy through
individual acts of shelter and rescue.
The case for humanitarian non-refoulement is particularly strong in wealthier states outside the zone of conflict, which have enhanced resources to defuse
armed conflicts by addressing their root causes, and to assist those war-affected
individuals who have made the journey from the developing to the industrialised world. Humanitarian non-refoulement provides a modest mechanism by
which higher-income States can alleviate the socio-economic inequities
between the Global North and South, conditions which themselves inflame
conditions of unrest and armed conflict. In confronting the complex web
of poverty, political repression and military violence, humanitarian nonrefoulement enables the ‘protecting powers’60 to respond, one war refugee
at a time.
60

‘Protecting powers’ has a broader meaning here than its classic usage under ihl. In the
spirit of the principle of protection, the term is not limited to parties to a conflict, or
occupying States, but applies more broadly to all States in a position to assist victims of
war, especially those States in which individuals seek relief from forced return to indiscriminate military violence.
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